Iran Deal – Part Two – The Agreement

Welcome back My Dear Shoevians to The Other Shoe. As promised, today I am sharing with all of you the very TEXT of the ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ aka the ‘P5+1 Iran Nuclear Agreement’. Today’s article has taken several days to complete. I do this out of a love of PEACE and the best possible future for our nation and its inhabitants. I do this for PEACE.  . Now, without further adieu, I give you… … …    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) . PREAMBLE TO AGREEMENT:  PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT. v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter. vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013. ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex. x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved. xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices. xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document. xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through IAEA involvement. xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day. xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes. xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus. I. Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes  . . “Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I. –“   This is a MORE THAN 50% DESCREASE in working centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz Fuel Enrichment plant. They HAD, roughly, 9,000 first generation enrichment centrifuges going, that give them enough fuel for a single nuclear weapon in TWO months.  . NEXT –   “Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years,”  . For more information on IR-8 centrifuges, Iran’s claims about these advanced centrifuges and their yield go here: http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IR8_Sept__2014.pdf . Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material. . This greatly limits Iran ability to refine fissile material and store or stockpile fissile material. The IAEA has developed a strict ‘Known’ inspection schedule and also has the right and the ability to make spot inspections with as little as a 24 HOUR window. IAEA inspectors will wait just outside of facilities that are undergoing ‘spot inspections’ thereby inhibiting Iran’s ability to remove large items like centrifuges and shielded containers.  . Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I. . THIS line item DECREASES Iran’s Uranium Enrichment facilities IN HALF! This is a MAJOR concession by Iran, and a HUGE WIN for America and our Allies.  . During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level.”   This is the VERY FRIST time any agreement or treaty, with Iran, has been successful in limiting the stockpiling of enriched uranium hexafluoride. When refined into a fissile state the 300KG of uranium is reduced to 2% of its initial mass . Than means that a 300kg stockpile will result in 6KG of fissile material. The ‘Little Boy’ trigger-type atomic bomb, that was dropped on Hiroshima, contained 64KG of enriched Uranium, TEN TIMES the amount Iran will have at any given time. Far less, a fraction, of what is needed to great a twentieth century ‘atomic’ device/bomb.  . “ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING 8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.”  . Result, Iran will LOOSE one of it NEWEST refinement facilities and one of the ONLY ‘Heavy Water’ reactors Iran has built. “There are some proliferation concerns about the reactor's ability to produce enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons each year.“  This is a tremendous loss to their weapons capability, but can be turned into a huge asset for the production of material for nuclear power plants. . “There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market. . Combined with the loss of Arak, this concession all but cripples Iran capabilities for generating fissile material for more than a DECADE. A decade after this agreement ENDS. That means that Iran will NOT be at the point they are at TODAY until sometime in 2035!!!  . For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.”  . This concession should allay MUCH concern about Iran providing fissile or even ‘dirty bomb’ materials to; ISIS, Al Quida, the Taliban, or any other terrorist organizations for the next GENERATION. With this agreement, Iran significantly removes its role as state supported terrorism.  . “Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.”   . A historic measure, right here: “a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years,” . A “LONG TERM PRESSENCE OF THE IAEA I N IRAN!!! This is a concession America and the Western world has wanted for a generation, and President Obama and Sec. John Kerry GOT IT!  . “Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities”,   Thereby GREATLY LIMITING the SCIENCE that is NESSECARY for creating a nuclear device. Curtailing Iran’s ability to design, build and execute a VIABLE nuclear device for MORE THAN an GENERATION. This hobbles Iran’s plans for a nuclear bomb! . Now, My Dear Shoevians, over the past two weeks we have all heard the shrill cries of Republicans that “America is giving money to Iran…” Just yesterday, July 27th, during Sec. Kerry’s testimony in front of Congress a Representative claimed “America is giving Iran a Signing bonus!!!” Strictly non-factual hyperbolic rhetoric, and below is the proof why! America is not giving any money to Iran. No, the United Nations is releasing money that Iran has already earned but was HELD due to international sanctions. Here is the financial remedies Republicans are desperate to spin into “America giving Iran Billions!’ . “The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II: i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions; ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States; iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance; iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions; v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance); vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran; vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds; viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products; ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology; xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers; xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services; xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights; xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds; xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage; xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes; xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and xix. Associated services for each of the categories above. 20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. 21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclearrelated measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II: i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit); ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial; iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran; iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer; v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds; vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II; vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance; viii. Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales; ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran; xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran; xii. Transactions with Iran's energy sector;…”  . NONE of these release of held funds will happen UNTIL “to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V.”  MEANING that NO money or financial instruments are to be released UNTIL Iran MEETS with IAEA VERIFIED implementation!! No COMPLIANCE = NO MONEY!! Period. This, right here, SHOOTS DOWN ALL Republican claims of “America giving Iran money for a “signing bonus” or that America is “giving Iran money for state sponsored terrorism”.  . Now, for America’s sanctions on Iran and any/all Congressional sanctions on Iran and Congressionally held funds from sale of oil from Iran.  . “Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.”  . Not until EIGHT YEARS after Adopition Day, or when the IAEA has reached the ‘Broader Conclusion’ that “ALL nuclear material in Iran REMAINS in PEACEFUL activities…” BINGO! NO money until EIGHT YEARS of Iran PROVING that their nuclear materials are ONLY being used for “Peaceful purposes”. Period! . “Trust but VERIFY” . “The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.”  . Here the treaty begins outlining the verification process, as it is to be handled by the E3/EU3 & America. This paragraph shows details of the structure of guidelines/statements given during the process. . “The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements[2]. The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.”  . This paragraph ties the E3/EU+3 and America to a transparent process and assures that no punitive actions are taken, either unilaterally or in concert with other nations. This protects Iran from legislative actions, not arising directly from the member nations, but from their legislative bodies. . “The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.”   . Prevents “normalization” of trade and economic relations outside of the parameters outlined in the JCPOA, thereby limiting member nations to the letter of the agreement and not the spirit. . The following two sections outline the same parameters and structure dealing with; Banking and Financial Instruments. All sanctions shall be lifted only according to the JCPOA.  . Section 32 –  “EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.”    . This paragraph further limits “nuclear technology” for peaceful purposes in Iran strictly limiting them to “power production… medical… research reactors… and fuel fabrication”. Thereby cutting OFF all pathways to; nuclear weapons, nuclear fissile materials and research and development of nuclear technologies for weaponry.  . The following quote(s) outline the “Implementation” of the JCPOA and all of its articles and agreements.  . “The milestones for implementation are as follows: i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.”  . This “finalization day” has already passed, as we are already in possession of the finished document. This paragraph outlines that there should be NO delays, once the agreement is reached, leading to finalization. . “ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.”  . Clearly stated, the “Adoption Day” (beginning of the clock for all time related elements of the agreement, begins after the passing of the 90th day post United Nations approval. This gives all of the P5+1 a stopwatch for all the elements contained within the agreement.  . “Implementation Day” is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.”  . Annex V Part 15-  15. Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I: 15. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor"; 15. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on "Heavy Water Production Plant"; 15. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on "Enrichment Capacity"; 15. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on "Centrifuges Research and Development"; 15. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant"; 15. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on "Other Aspects of Enrichment"; 15. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on "Uranium Stocks and Fuels"; 15. Paragraph 62 from Section K on "Centrifuge Manufacturing";  Section ‘B’ #2,3 & 10 B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR 2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to”  produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned purposes and principles of modernisation. 3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research  . OK! My Dear Shoevians, do you remember the ‘Preamble’ that I stated was so very important? Everything you see in the above paragraphs IS included in the ‘Statements of Intent and Structure’ of the Preamble’. I have included ALL the text of this ONE FULL Textual Path of “Implementation Day” so that you, My Dear Shoevians, can see and understand how the Preamble is the skeleton of the agreement. All of the text, above, outlines the “Implementation Day” prerequisites and agreed upon actions. I have included just the entire text-path for Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor because including ALL the EIGHT sections would give you about ten pages of that kind of reading.  . As I indicated, these eight text-paths ALL concern the; closing of, refurbishing of for “peaceful pruposes”, and/or destruction of nuclear facilities with in Iran. FYI – This IS a very good look INTO the ‘Private Agreement’ between the IAEA and Iran (that Senators and Representatives have been screaming… for). ALL of this text is available if you follow the embedded link at the very end of this article. I will now move on to the next section of the agreement.  . “Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.”  . “Transition Day” – Quite simply; the IAEA has been allowed all necessary and requested inspections to the satisfaction of their personnel to reach the “Broader Conclusion” that (indeed, and against the howlings of our Republican Party) “all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities…” This is the day when Iran has met the: requirements, parameters, structure and textual pathways of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That Iran is in complete compliance with the agreement, and has remained in compliance for the term and scope of the agreement.  . “UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V. 35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA” . . This paragraph defines, for the United Nations, that the ‘Termination Day’ (for the U.N.) is “10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated”. Meaning, one decade of Iran NOT screwing the pooch. Simple enough, eh? . OK, My Dear Shoevians, that brings us to the very end of the ‘sections’ of the agreement. You see, First there is the ‘Preamble’. Then there are the ‘sections’. After that comes the “Dispute Resolution Mechanism” and finally the ‘Annexes’ that contain all the; tonnage, ship names, facility names and locations, and all of the ‘Nuclear Assets of Iran’.  I am going to share with you the “Dispute Resolution Mechanism” but am not going to quote and explain all the ‘Annexes’ of this agreement. It is now Noon, and if I work quickly I can have this article; finished editing and adding left-out footnotes, uploaded, images (if any) embedded and publishing… … … by dinner time, tonight. That is my goal.  . DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM: . “If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant nonperformance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.”  . Simple, this is like the ‘Arbitration Agreement’ all of us sign when we; go to a doctor, are admitted to a hospital or treatment center. This is an outline of the process and critical pathway for resolution of any/all disputes. Either with Iran, or with the E3/EU+3. BOTH sides have equal access to the dispute mechanism.  . “Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part”- . . This paragraph outlines the United Nations role in; lifting of sanctions outside the agreement as part of a ‘Dispute Resolution’. This means that the United Nations Security Council can vote to: keep sanctions in place OR remove sanctions currently in place as part of any/all ‘Dispute Resolutions’ process.  . My Dear Shoevians, the following are the remaining headings for the Annexes that make up the following 130 pages.  . Annex I – Nuclear-related measures A.	GENERAL . B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR . C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT . D. OTHER REACTOR . E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES . F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY . G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT . H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT  . I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT . J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS . K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING . L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1 .” 64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament). 65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.”   . Outlining provisions of the inclusion of, and handling, modified protocol and code within the agreement.  . M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN . “Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues”, as verified by the IAEA in its regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this Roadmap.”.  . N.MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA . (This is the VERIFY language… PART of Lonnie and ‘others’)  “67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years or longer, for the specified verification measures: 67. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear sites. 67. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence, including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment. 67. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran, consistent with its laws and regulations.”  . Well, My Dear Shoevians, here are some TEETH! This ‘Section N’ contains the essential language for the IAEA to have: “of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear sites”  This IS unprecedented access to ALL Iran’s nuclear facilities. NEVER before in the history of nuclear agreements (SALT-1,2,3 – ANY USSR/US nuclear agreements). This gives the IAEA “LONG TERM PRESSENCE IN IRAN”!!!! This, TOO, is UNPRECIDENTED in the history of the IAEA and nuclear agreements of the 20th century. Finally, Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA” The IAEA will have an UNPRECIDENTED NMUBER of inspectors ON THE GROUND IN IRAN!  . Let’s review; Electronic WIRELESS tagging of: centrifuges, reactors, fuel rods ect… ALL ACESS passes to ALL Iran’;s nuclear facilities and (finally) an UNPRECIDENTED number – 130-150 IAEA inspectors ON THE GROUND 7/365! Now, THAT IS VERIFICATION!  . O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC) . “68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period. 69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.”  . The IAEA will MONITOR (via containment and surveillance measures) ALL uranium ore concentrate for… … … TWNETY-FIVE YEARS!!! (that’s a generation to you and me) . P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT . “70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex. 71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15 years.”  . For FIFTEEN YEARS “all access continuous monitoring” via “containment and surveillance measures” of ALL enrichment processed at ALL facilities for FIFTEEN YEARS!  . Q. ACCESS . Pretty much outlined above; all access via; electronic, containment and surveillance measures from fifteen to twenty-five years. That is unprecedented access and monitoring.  . R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY . This gets very technical, let me layman this for you.  Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.”  . A complete inventory of ALL centrifuges, both domestic and military, and of all rotors and tubes. Constant surveillance via the electronic, containment. (This includes those nifty Wi-Fi GPS tags that can SCREAM at the IAEA) . S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES . T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE . 	“82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device: 82. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices. 82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring. 82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring. 82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.”  . Well, My Dear Shoevians, that brings me to the end of this ‘Part Two 0 The Agreement’ of my article ‘Iran – Deal or War’. I hope that everyone has enjoyed and learned… I know that I have. Now, for all my Facebook friends, IF you have read this article and still have concerns? Write to me via my email addy at my new blog location. It is included in the ‘About’ page of the new blog. These two articles have really pretty much wiped me out.  . I really wanted to put this information into the hands of you, My Dear Shoevians, that you can have informed and educated discussions about this agreement. As well, I very much wanted to end the hyperbolic rhetoric about “giving signing bonuses” and “America giving money to Iran for terrorism”. AS you can ALL now, plainly, see there are NO provisions for ANY payments by America to Iran.  . If Iran keeps to this deal, for Twenty-Five years, then THEIR (already earned by held by EU/America) assets will be RETURNED to the government and people of Iran. There is NO ‘pay-for-play’ in this agreement.  . Finally, thank you all for dropping by. If you have found this article informative and even educational? PLEASE ‘Like’ and ‘Share’ this article on all your social media.  . Adieu!  . Thank you! . © 2010 – 2015 Hanning Web Wurx and The Other Shoe.

Welcome back My Dear Shoevians to The Other Shoe. As promised, today I am sharing with all of you the very TEXT of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ aka the ‘P5+1 Iran Nuclear Agreement’. Today’s article has taken several days to complete. I do this out of a love of PEACE and the best possible future for our nation and its inhabitants. I do this for PEACE.

.

Now, without further adieu, I give you… … …

 

 

 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

.

PREAMBLE TO AGREEMENT:

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the

Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High

Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)

have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

(JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal

commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to

be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful

nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or

acquire any nuclear weapons.

iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right

to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the

nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and

the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of

any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.

v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council

sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear

programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and

energy.

vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles

of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.

vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the

nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of

nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a

constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any

action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would

undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from

imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the

sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on

the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24

November 2013.

ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to

monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions

provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising

from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the

provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.

x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and

verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The

IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors,

and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules

and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be

fully observed by all parties involved.

xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of

its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as

setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of

international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other

relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and

practices.

xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the

annexes to this document.

xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will

cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and

engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in

Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.

xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing

this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in

its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new

relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for

the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous

resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of

consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after

the Adoption Day.

xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective

durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.

xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier

if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate

decisions by consensus.

I.

Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as

detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes[1]

.

.

“Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,

Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed

uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and

enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA

continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I. –“[2]

This is a MORE THAN 50% DECREASE in working centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz Fuel Enrichment plant. They HAD, roughly, 9,000first generation enrichment centrifuges going, that WOULD HAVE given them enough fuel for a single nuclear weapon in TWO months.

.

NEXT –

“Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not

accumulate enriched uranium. Iran’s enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years

will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and

Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of

uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8

centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges

after eight and a half years,”[3]

.

For more information on IR-8 centrifuges, Iran’s claims about these advanced centrifuges and their yield go here:

http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IR8_Sept__2014.pdf

.

“Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium

enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the

Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%,

and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment

R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.”

.

This greatly limits Iran ability to refine fissile material and store or stockpile fissile material. The IAEA has developed a strict ‘Known’ inspection schedule and also has the right and the ability to make spot inspections with as little as a 24 HOUR window. IAEA inspectors will wait just outside of facilities that are undergoing ‘spot inspections’ thereby inhibiting Iran’s ability to remove large items like centrifuges and shielded containers.

.

Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology

centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint

partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1

centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these

cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through

appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other

four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other

centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored

under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.

.

THIS line item DECREASES Iran’s Uranium Enrichment facilities IN HALF! This is a MAJOR concession by Iran, and a HUGE WIN for America and our Allies.

 

.

During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international

qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium

stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or

the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold

based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return

for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural

uranium level.”[4]

 

This is the VERY FIRST time any agreement or treaty, with Iran, has been successful in limiting the stockpiling of enriched uranium hexafluoride. When refined into a fissile state the 300KG of uranium is reduced to 2% of its initial mass[5]. Than means that a 300kg stockpile will result in 6KG of fissile material. The ‘Little Boy’ trigger-type atomic bomb, that was dropped on Hiroshima, contained 64KG of enriched Uranium, TEN TIMES the amount Iran will have at any given time. Far less, a fraction, of what is needed to great a twentieth century ‘atomic’ device/bomb.

.

“ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING

8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in

Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in

a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The

reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for

medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will

not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the

activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the

redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be

shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership

will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may

be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as

the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed

by the E3/EU+3 participants.”[6]

.

Result, Iran will LOOSE one of it NEWEST refinement facilities and one of the ONLY ‘Heavy Water’reactors Iran has built. There are some proliferation concerns about the reactor’s ability to produce enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons each year.[7] This is a tremendous loss to their weapons capability, but can be turned into a huge asset for the production of material for nuclear power plants.

.

“There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy

water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for

export to the international market.”

.

Combined with the loss of Arak, this concession all but cripples Iran capabilities for generating fissile material for more than a DECADE. A decade after this agreement ENDS. That means that Iran will NOT be at the point they are at TODAY until sometime in 2035!!!

.

For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any

spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel

reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel

reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed

exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from

irradiated enriched uranium targets.”[8]

.

This concession should allay MUCH concern about Iran providing fissile or even ‘dirty bomb’ materials to; ISIS, Al Quida, the Taliban, or any other terrorist organizations for the next GENERATION. With this agreement, Iran significantly removes its role as state supported terrorism.

.

“Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary

measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency

measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a

long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate

produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years;

containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use

of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line

enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to

ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in

Annex I.”[9]

.

A historic measure, right here:

long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate

produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years;

containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use

of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line

enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to

ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years,”

.

A “LONG TERM PRESENCE OF THE IAEA I N IRAN!!! This is a concession America and the Western world has wanted for a generation, and President Obama and Sec. John Kerry GOT IT!

.

“Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could

contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium

or plutonium metallurgy activities”,[10]

 

Thereby GREATLY LIMITING the SCIENCE that is NECESSARY for creating a nuclear device. Curtailing Iran’s ability to design, build and execute a VIABLE nuclear device for MORE THAN an GENERATION. This hobbles Iran’s plans for a nuclear bomb!

.

Now, My Dear Shoevians, over the past two weeks we have all heard the shrill cries of Republicans that “America is giving money to Iran…” Just yesterday, July 27th, during Sec. Kerry’s testimony in front of Congress a Representative claimed “America is giving Iran a Signing bonus!!!” Strictly non-factual hyperbolic rhetoric, and below is the proof why! America is not giving any money to Iran. No, the United Nations is releasing money that Iran has already earned but was HELD due to international sanctions. Here is the financial remedies Republicans are desperate to spin into“America giving Iran Billions!’

.

“The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently

amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions,

including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified

implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in

Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following

areas, as described in Annex II:

i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial

institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;

ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking

relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks

in the territories of EU Member States;

iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;

iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons

and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of

Iran and Iranian financial institutions;

v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);

vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the

Government of Iran;

vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;

viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical

products;

ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical

sectors;

x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;

xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology;

xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;

xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;

xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;

xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;

xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;

xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and

export or software for integrating industrial processes;

xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in

Attachment 1 to Annex II; and

xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.

20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU

proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after

Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all

nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in

accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect

simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclearrelated

measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the

following areas as described in Annex II:

i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions

as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified

individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of

Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked

Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the

opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at

non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and

letters of credit);

ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;

iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;

iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on

their transfer;

v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign

debt, including governmental bonds;

vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial

institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;

vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;

viii. Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales;

ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services,

information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran’s oil, gas

and petrochemical sectors;

x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum,

petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;

xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical

products to Iran;

xii. Transactions with Iran’s energy sector;…”[11]

.

NONE of these release of held funds will happen UNTIL to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V.”  MEANING that NO money or financial instruments are to be released UNTIL Iran MEETS with IAEA VERIFIED implementation!! No COMPLIANCE = NO MONEY!! Period. This, right here, SHOOTS DOWN ALL Republican claims of “America giving Iran money for a “signing bonus” or that America is “giving Iran money for state sponsored terrorism”.

.

Now, for America’s sanctions on Iran and any/all Congressional sanctions on Iran and Congressionally held funds from sale of oil from Iran.

.

Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader

Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities,

whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may

be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the

sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related

commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to

be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under

the NPT.”[12]

.

Not until EIGHT YEARS after Adopition Day, or when the IAEA has reached the ‘Broader Conclusion’that “ALL nuclear material in Iran REMAINS in PEACEFUL activities…” BINGO! NO money until EIGHT YEARS of Iran PROVING that their nuclear materials are ONLY being used for “Peaceful purposes”. Period!

.

“Trust but VERIFY”

.

“The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to

ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under

this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will

issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the

details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this

JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult

with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular

basis and whenever appropriate.”[13]

.

Here the treaty begins outlining the verification process, as it is to be handled by the E3/EU3 & America. This paragraph shows details of the structure of guidelines/statements given during the process.

.

The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a

constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any

action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would

undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the

E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful

implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements[2]. The

E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from

imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements

in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.”[14]

.

This paragraph ties the E3/EU+3 and America to a transparent process and assures that no punitiveactions are taken, either unilaterally or in concert with other nations. This protects Iran from legislative actions, not arising directly from the member nations, but from their legislative bodies.

.

The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their

respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and

adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran

inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful

implementation of this JCPOA.”[15]

.

Prevents “normalization” of trade and economic relations outside of the parameters outlined in the JCPOA, thereby limiting member nations to the letter of the agreement and not the spirit.

.

The following two sections outline the same parameters and structure dealing with; Banking and Financial Instruments. All sanctions shall be lifted only according to the JCPOA.

.

Section 32 –

EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint

projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the

field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research

reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion,

establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel

training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed

in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the

implementation of these projects.”[16]  

.

This paragraph further limits “nuclear technology” for peaceful purposes in Iran strictly limiting them to “power production… medical… research reactors… and fuel fabrication”. Thereby cutting OFF all pathways to; nuclear weapons, nuclear fissile materials and research and development of nuclear technologies for weaponry.

.

The following quote(s) outline the “Implementation” of the JCPOA and all of its articles and agreements.

.

“The milestones for implementation are as

follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded

among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the

resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without

delay.”[17]

.

This “finalization day” has already passed, as we are already in possession of the finished document. This paragraph outlines that there should be NO delays, once the agreement is reached, leading tofinalization.

.

“ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN

Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent

of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this

JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make

necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA

commitments.”[18]

.

Clearly stated, the “Adoption Day” (beginning of the clock for all time related elements of the agreement, begins after the passing of the 90th day post United Nations approval. This gives all of theP5+1 a stopwatch for all the elements contained within the agreement.

.

Implementation Day” is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report

verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in

Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the

actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in

accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in

Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.[19]

.

Annex V Part 15-

15. Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I:

15. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on “Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor”;

15. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on “Heavy Water Production Plant”;

15. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on “Enrichment Capacity”;

15. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on

“Centrifuges Research and Development”;

15. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on “Fordow Fuel

Enrichment Plant”;

15. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on “Other Aspects of Enrichment”;

15. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on “Uranium Stocks and Fuels”;

15. Paragraph 62 from Section K on “Centrifuge Manufacturing”;[20]

Section ‘B’ #2,3 & 10

B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR

2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear

research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will

redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached

to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and

purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural

materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to”[21]

produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned

reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that

the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary

adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned

purposes and principles of modernisation.

3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original

design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be

made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the

IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning

and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will

maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research[22]

.

OK! My Dear Shoevians, do you remember the ‘Preamble’ that I stated was so very important?Everything you see in the above paragraphs IS included in the ‘Statements of Intent and Structure’of the Preamble’. I have included ALL the text of this ONE FULL Textual Path of “Implementation Day” so that you, My Dear Shoevians, can see and understand how the Preamble is the skeleton of the agreement. All of the text, above, outlines the “Implementation Day” prerequisites and agreed upon actions. I have included just the entire text-path for Section B on “Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor because including ALL the EIGHT sections would give you about ten pages of that kind of reading.

.

As I indicated, these eight text-paths ALL concern the; closing of, refurbishing of for “peaceful pruposes”, and/or destruction of nuclear facilities with in Iran. FYI – This IS a very good look INTOthe ‘Private Agreement’ between the IAEA and Iran (that Senators and Representatives have beenscreaming… for). ALL of this text is available if you follow the embedded link at the very end of this article. I will now move on to the next section of the agreement.

.

“Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the

Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached

the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful

activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will

take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and

Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and

Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.”[23]

.

UN General Horo and Sec. John Kerry

.

“Transition Day” – Quite simply; the IAEA has been allowed all necessary and requested inspections to the satisfaction of their personnel to reach the “Broader Conclusion” that (indeed, and against the howlings of our Republican Party) all nuclear material in Iran remains in peacefulactivities…” This is the day when Iran has met the: requirements, parameters, structure and textual pathways of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That Iran is in complete compliance with the agreement, and has remained in compliance for the term and scope of the agreement.

.

“UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN

Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its

terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions

of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take

the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.

35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without

prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA”[24].

.

This paragraph defines, for the United Nations, that the ‘Termination Day’ (for the U.N.) is “10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions

of previous resolutions have not been reinstated”. Meaning, one decade of Iran NOT screwing the pooch. Simple enough, eh?

.

OK, My Dear Shoevians, that brings us to the very end of the ‘sections’ of the agreement. You see,First there is the ‘Preamble’. Then there are the ‘sections’. After that comes the “Dispute Resolution Mechanism” and finally the ‘Annexes’ that contain all the; tonnage, ship names, facility names and locations, and all of the ‘Nuclear Assets of Iran’.  I am going to share with you the“Dispute Resolution Mechanism” but am not going to quote and explain all the ‘Annexes’ of this agreement. It is now Noon, and if I work quickly I can have this article; finished editing and adding left-out footnotes, uploaded, images (if any) embedded and publishing… … … by dinner time, tonight. That is my goal.

.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM:

.

If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their

commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint

Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran

was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could

do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue,

unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission

consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign

Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers

would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended

by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu

of) review at the Ministerial level – either the complaining participant or the

participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be

considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one

each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent

member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the

compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not

resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory

Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has

not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the

complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant nonperformance,

then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds

to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part

and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes

significant non-performance.”[25]

.

Simple, this is like the ‘Arbitration Agreement’ all of us sign when we; go to a doctor, are admitted to a hospital or treatment center. This is an outline of the process and critical pathway for resolution of any/all disputes. Either with Iran, or with the E3/EU+3. BOTH sides have equal access to the dispute mechanism.

.

Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described

above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to

exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security

Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to

continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been

adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN

Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security

Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with

retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian

individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the

activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent

with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions.

The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of

the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this

period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue

and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if

sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to

cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part”-[26].

.

This paragraph outlines the United Nations role in; lifting of sanctions outside the agreement aspart of a ‘Dispute Resolution’. This means that the United Nations Security Council can vote to: keep sanctions in place OR remove sanctions currently in place as part of any/all ‘Dispute Resolutions’ process.

.

My Dear Shoevians, the following are the remaining headings for the Annexes that make up the following 130 pages.

.

Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

  1. GENERAL

.

B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR

.

C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT

.

D. OTHER REACTOR

.

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

.

F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY

.

G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

.

H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT

.

I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT

.

J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS

.

K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING

.

L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1

. 64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its

Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol

pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force,

consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament).

65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the

Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards

Agreement remains in force.”[27]

.

Outlining provisions of the inclusion of, and handling, modified protocol and code within the agreement.

.

M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN

.

Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the “Roadmap

for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues”, as verified by the IAEA in its

regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this

Roadmap.”.[28]

.

N.MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA

.

(This is the VERIFY language… PART of Lonnie and ‘others’)

67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years

or longer, for the specified verification measures:

67. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic

seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as

other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally

accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement

recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working

space in individual nuclear sites.

67. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence,

including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear

sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated

IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.

67. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150

within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally

allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran,

consistent with its laws and regulations.”[29]

.

Well, My Dear Shoevians, here are some TEETH! This ‘Section N’ contains the essential language for the IAEA to have:

of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic

seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as

other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally

accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement

recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working

space in individual nuclear sites”  

.

This IS unprecedented access to ALL Iran’s nuclear facilities. NEVER before in the history of nuclear agreements (SALT-1,2,3 – ANY USSR/US nuclear agreements). This gives the IAEA “LONG TERM PRESENCE IN IRAN”!!!! This, TOO, is UNPRECEDENTED in the history of the IAEA and nuclear agreements of the 20th century. Finally, Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA” The IAEA will have an UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER of inspectors ON THE GROUND IN IRAN!

.

Let’s review; Electronic WIRELESS tagging of: centrifuges, reactors, fuel rods ect… ALL ACCESS passes to ALL Iran’;s nuclear facilities and (finally) an UNPRECEDENTED number – 130-150 IAEA inspectors ON THE GROUND 7/365! Now, THAT IS VERIFICATION!

.

O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)

.

68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include

containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate

produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium

conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility

which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.

69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able

to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore

concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.”[30]

.

The IAEA will MONITOR (via containment and surveillance measures) ALL uranium ore concentrate for… … … TWNETY-FIVE YEARS!!! (that’s a generation to you and me)

.

P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT

.

70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including

through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored

centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or

damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.

71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the

IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15

years.”[31]

.

For FIFTEEN YEARS “all access continuous monitoring” via “containment and surveillance measures” of ALL enrichment processed at ALL facilities for FIFTEEN YEARS!

.

Q. ACCESS

.

Pretty much outlined above; all access via; electronic, containment and surveillance measures from fifteen to twenty-five years. That is unprecedented access and monitoring.

.

R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY

.

This gets very technical, let me layman this for you.

Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on

centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.”[32]

.

A complete inventory of ALL centrifuges, both domestic and military, and of all rotors and tubes. Constant surveillance via the electronic, containment. (This includes those nifty Wi-Fi GPS tags that can SCREAM at the IAEA)

.

S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES

.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

.

            82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development

of a nuclear explosive device:

82. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear

explosive devices.

82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation

systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint

Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems

(streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the

development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission

for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron

sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.”[33]

.

P5+1 Ministers With Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in Vienna
P5+1 Ministers With Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in Vienna

.

Well, My Dear Shoevians, that brings me to the end of this ‘Part Two 0 The Agreement’ of my article ‘Iran – Deal or War’. I hope that everyone has enjoyed and learned… I know that I have. Now, for all my Facebook friends, IF you have read this article and still have concerns? Write to me via my email addy at my new blog location. It is included in the ‘About’ page of the new blog. These two articles have really pretty much wiped me out.

.

I really wanted to put this information into the hands of you, My Dear Shoevians, that you can have informed and educated discussions about this agreement. As well, I very much wanted to end thehyperbolic rhetoric about “giving signing bonuses” and “America giving money to Iran for terrorism”. AS you can ALL now, plainly, see there are NO provisions for ANY payments by Americato Iran.

.

If Iran keeps to this deal, for Twenty-Five years, then THEIR (already earned by held by EU/America) assets will be RETURNED to the government and people of Iran. There is NO ‘pay-for-play’ in this agreement.

.

Finally, thank you all for dropping by. If you have found this article informative and even educational? PLEASE Like’ and ‘Share’ this article on all your social media.

.

Adieu!

.

Thank you!

.

FYI – The FULL TEXT of the JCPOA I reviewed here is available for download here: Text of P5+1 Iran Nuclear Deal

Danny Hanning Writer, Editor, Research Staff and Publisher at The Other Shoe
Danny Hanning Writer, Editor, Research Staff and Publisher at The Other Shoe

© 2010 – 2015 Hanning Web Wurx and The Other Shoe

 


[1] Page(s) #2-5 of JCPOA

[2] Page #6 of JCPOA

[3] Page #7 of JCPOA

[4] Page(s) #7-8 of JCPOA

[6] Page(s) 8-9 of JCPOA

[8] Page(s) 9-10 of JCPOA

[9] Page #10 of JCPOA

[10] Page #11 JCPOA

[11] Page(s) #11-14 of JCPOA

[12] Page #14 of JCPOA

[13] Page #16 Of JCPOA

[14] Page #16 of JCPOA

[15] Page #16 of JCPOA

[16] Page #17 of JCPOA

[17] Page #18 of JCPOA

[18] Page #18 JCPOA

[19] Page #18 of JCPOA

[20] Page #155 of JCPOA

[21] Page #21 of JCPOA

[22] Page #23 of JCPOA

[23] Page #18 of JCPOA

[24] Page #19 of JCPOA

[25] Page #20 of JCPOA

[26] Page(s) #20-21 of JCPOA

[27] Page #38 JCPOA

[28] Page #38 JCPOA

[29] Page(s) #39-40 JCPOA

[30] Page #40 JCPOA

[31] Page #41 of JCPOA

[32] Page #44 of JCPOA

[33] Page #45 of JCPOA 

 

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